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Abstract. This paper formulates a medium-term macroeconomic model of disposable incomc, un-
ernployment, inflation and state spending, proposes a theory of qualitative choice to explain eleo-
toral popularity in terms of thcse variables and develops three approaches to the formulation of
political-economic policy. The first approach is static, sets the tax rate to reconcile the interests
of various pressure groups and yields a political trade-off between the private and public sector.
The second approach relies on maximizing the probability of winning the next election and gives
rise to a poli[ical business cycle unless the electorate votes strategically. The implicalions of crowd-
ing out of private investmcnt under alternative monetary rules, autonomous behavíour of the state
bureaucracy and lax-indexation for the political business cycle are also examined. The third
approach analyzes theobjective of maximizing the uninterrupted length in office. It yields a short-
run political cycle superimposed on a longer cycte.
1. Introduction
The theory of economic policy views the government as a benevolent dictator
who implements policy in an attempt to promote social welfare. It is concerned
with how a government oughl to behave, so that it has a normative character.
It ignores the fact that a government has objectives of its own, manifested in
its ideology and its attempts to secure re-election, which may well differ from
the social welfare objective. Positive theories of how a government ac[ually be-
haves are needed and provided by political economics (e.g., Kalecki, 1943;
Nordhaus, 1975; Lindbeck, 1976; Frey, 1978b). They are the subject of this
paper.
Existing theories of political economics (see surveys in Frey, 1978a; and
1978b) suffer from at least three problems. Firstly, most studies relate popular-
ity to economic performance in an ad-hoc manner and therefore lack a satis-
factory theory of voting behaviour. Secondly, the public sector is usually not
separated into the component which does nol depend on the electorate for sur-
vival, e.g., the state bureaucracy and the monetary authorities, and the part
which does depend on re-election for its survival, the government. ln practice
there may be contlict between these components of the public sector, which so
' The author thanks Vani Borooah, Wim Driehuis and Frans van winden for their useful comments.
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far has bcen ignored. Thirdly, prcvious studies of the optimal political busi-
ness cycle (e.g., Nordhaus, 1975; Frey and Ramser, 1976; MacRac, 1977) fo-
cus on the political tradc-off between inflation and unemployment and ignure
the effects of real personal disposable income and state spending on electoral
popularity. Furthermore, these studies do not discuss the policy instrumcntar-
ium necessary to attain the optimal unemployment trajectory.
This paper attempts to remedy the above deficiencies by postulating a com-
plete macroeconomic model of the economy ( goods, moncy and labour mar-
kcts) and the bureaucracy ( Section 2), proposing a theory of qualitative choice
to explain electoral popularity ( Section 3), discussing optimal approaches to
the formulation of political-economic strategies for the government and exam-
ining the implications of such strategies within the context of a closed political-
economic system ( Sections 4-8).
2. The economy without political feedbacks
Instantaneous equilibrium of the goods and the money markets are described
by thc IS- and LM-curve, respectively. The IS-curve is given byt
Q-C(Q-rQ)f 1(r-p`)tG,OGCtGI,ltGO (I)
where Q, C, I, G, r, r and p` denote respectively real output, personal con-
sumption, private investment, government consumption, the direct tax rate,
the nominal interest rate and the expected rate of inflation. For simplicity it
is assumed that there is only direct taxation, all interest payments to the per-
sonal sector are saved, wealth effects are not present in the consumption func-
tion and the stock of capital is fixed in the short run. Investment simply de-
pends on the expected real rate of return on the alternative asset, (r - p`). The
assumption relating to investment are not too unrealistic, since this paper fo-
cuses on the Iength of an election period and therefore concentrates on rather
short-term effects. The money market is described by the LM-curve, which
is given by
M ~ P- L(Q. r- P`~ - P`)~ L i ~ ~~ LZ ~ ~. L3 ~ ~ (2)
where M, I. and P denote respcctively the supply of money, the dcmand for
cash balances in real terms and the price Ievel. The agents in the econumy de-
mand moncy to financc transactions, capturcd by Q, to finance spcculation
activities, cxplained by the return on bonds, (r - p~), in rclation to thc return
on cash, - p`, and hold money for prccautionary purposcs. Thc cffccts of
wealth on the dcrnand for rnoney are ignored.
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Equations (1) and (2) may be solved to obtain the levcl of output and the real
rate of rcturn which cnsure simulatancous equilibrium of the goods and moncy
markcts. Thus Ihc Ievcl of output may be expressed as
Q- Q'(G, r, C`1 ~ P, p`)
whcrc
Q~ - ~l -(I-r)C~ f I~L~~LZ]-~ ~ 0,
(3)
QZ -- C~QQi c 0, Q~ -(li ~Lz)Qi ? 0, Qa - L~Q3 ? 0 and similarly for
the rcal ratc of rcturn on bonds, (r - p~). The multiplier for public dcmand,
Qi, is positive and inversely related to the propcnsity to save. Typically Qi ~
I, unless the depressing effects of a higher interest rate on private investmcnt,
called'crowding out', are large, that is unless IiLrILZ ~(1 - r)Ct. Cuts in
direct taxation and increases in the real supply of money also stimulate de-
mand. An increase in the expected rate of in(lation makes holding bonds more
attractive than holding money, hence raises the price of bonds and stimulates
investment and output.
The government budget constraint shows that the public sector deficit, de-
fined as public spending plus interest payments on the public debt minus taxes,
is financed by either printing money or issuing more bonds. It is given by
B I r f NI - P(G - ~Q) t(1 - r)B (4)
where B denotes a perpetual bond of price 1 Ir, and implies that of the four
policy variables available to the government only three can be chosen indepen-
dently. In this paper the issuing of bonds follows residually whilst the govern-
ment chooses policy rules for G, M and r. The first part of the RHS of (4), P(G
-~Q), is called the (primary) fiscal deficit.
The first rule comes from bureaucratic considerations, since the govern-
ment allows the state to expand demand as long as the costs of the state do not
exceed a certain fraction, say ~, of national output. This may be modelled by
the constraint
G-rQ 5 ~Q (5)
where the magnitude of the parameter ~ indicates the degree to which the
govcrnment is prepared to finance a large state. A constraint of the form (5)
has bcen important for some time in the [3ritish political debate, where the
Conservative administration had a ranged of 4.75~10 - I.Sclo for the value of
~ in mind. A more Keynesian administration would probably operate with a
zla
somewhat higher value of t. The constraint on the state is binding when one
makes the assumption of a budget-maximizing bureaucracy, which is a familiar
assumption in the public choice literature ( Niskanen, 1971; Mueller, 1979).
When the constraint on the state is binding, the multiplicrs of (3) may bc rc-
expressed in terms of G, M I P and p~ whilst r is used to mect the constraint
on the state (5). Upon substitution of r- (GIQ) - ~ into (3), one obtains
Q- Q"(G, M I P, P`) (~~)
whcre Q~~ - Qi'I(I - Ct equals the multiplier for output with respect to the
autonomous components of dcmand,
Qi' -(1 - Ct)I[I -(1 f~)Ct f 1rLtIL2] ~ 0,
QZ' -(I t I LZ)Q~' ? 0 and Q3' - L3QZ' ? 0. The multipliers in (tí) assume
that crowding out is sufficiently large or that ~ is sufficiently small to guaran-
tee the normal result Qi~ ~ 0. The case ~ - 0 corresponds to the familiar
Batanced Budget Multiplier Theorem (Haavelmo, 1945), which gives 0 c
Qi' s I and a somewhat smaller multiplier than before (Q~' c Qi). Hence,
if the expansion of public demand is completely financed by an increase in
direct taxation, output increases nevertheless. Relaxation of the state con-
straint (5), or less crowding out, increase the scope for demand management.
The monetary authority follows a simple growth rule for the nominal supply
of money, that is
IN-mM (7)
where m denotes the exogeneous growth rate of the supply of moncy.
To close the model an explanation of prices is needed. Assume that firms
have significant market power in the goods market and use this power to set
prices in order to maintain a certain desired share of profits in value added.
This hypothesis implies that
p-PIP-w-co~ (8)
where p, w and w~ denote respectively the rate of price inflation, the rate of
wage inflation and the rate of labour-augmenting technical progress. Assume
that workers, represented by unions or labour syndicates, have significant bar-
gaining strength in the labour market and use this to compensate themsclves
(partially) for increases in the cost of living and taxation. This hypothesis may
be proxied by the price- and tax-augmented Phillips-curve
zls
w - p~~ - {~tu t ~Zp` f ~j~I(I - r). ~~ ? 0. i - 1,2,3, (9)
whcrc ~ denotes the expected change in the rate of taxation and u denotes the
rate of uncmployment. A similar relationship has been used by Turnovsky
(1974), who also allowed for the implications of progressive taxation on ~Z
and ~~. ~Vorkers bargain, at Ieast partially, over after-tax wages and ~~ meas-
ures the success of labour in shifting the tax burden to firms. The tax term in
thc wagc cquation implics that workcrs do not value public spcnding as much
as thcir own private consumption.
Since the paper is primarily concerned with the intermediate term, Okun's
(1970) law may be used to explain uncmploymcnt in tcrms of output only:
u-)`( Q- Q). )` 1 0 (10)
whcrc Q denotes full employment output.
Combining equations (8)-(10) gives the reduced form price equation
P - kt)`Q t ~Zpe f ~~[0~(1 - r)] - ~ (11)
where w- m~ -~o f tci]`Q. Upon substitution of (3) into (I1), one obtains
P- P'(G, r, M I P. P`, ~) ( I Z)
whcre P; -~i~Q; ~ 0, i- 1. 3, PZ -~t~QZ e 0. Pa - ut]`Q4 f~2 ~ Oand
ps -~~ I( 1 - r) ~ 0. Hence, increases in public demand, the supply of
money or the expected rate of inflation raise output, cut unemployment and
therefore increase the rate of inflation. The expected inflation rate also exerts
an independent influence on the inflation rate. A permanent cut in the tax rate
has two effects on intlation. The first is to stimulate output and to increase the
rate of inflation permanently. The second effect is a transient increase in the
inflation rate, due to workers compensating themselves for the additional tax
burden, and dies out as soon as the tax rate has reached its new level.
The last equation of the economic part of the model incorporates the adap-
tive expectations mechanism
P` - u4(P - P`), kd z 0 (13)
which satisfies the weak and strong consistency axioms of forecasting (Turn-
ovsky, 1977). The average lag between an actual change in inflation and the
corresponding change in the expected inllation rate, 1 ~~a, also serves as the
average time it takes for unions and firms to agree on the compensation for
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Figure l. lnteractions between Ihe political process and the economyz
3. Electoral popularity and economic performance
v(T1.~
Section 2 discussed the economy without taking account of the political pro-
cess. Figure 1 gives a schematic view of the interactions between politics and
the economy. The behaviour of the electorate and the government remains to
be explained. This section discusses the influence of the performance of the
government, in terms of its social and economic policies, and the opposition
upon the voting behaviour of the electorate. In other words, an attempt to
explain the popularity of the incumbent political party is discussed. Sections
4-S show how electoral popularity might influence the policics adopted by thc
ruling political party and thus combine the economic and political modcls put
forward in Sections 2 and 3.
Consider the voting intentions of the members of a large nation with a gov-
ernntent (I) and an opposition party (2). Let Uk(t) denote the utility a voter










Uk(t) - Wk(t) f bk(t) (14)
where wk(t) is a measurc of economic performance of party k at time t and
b~(t) is a loyalty term specific to voter i. In other words, voters are alike in
that they do not differ in their evaluation of a party's economic performance,
although they do differ in thcir attachment (or lack of it) to each political
party. The loyalty terms, bk(t), vary across voters, since they rellect the influ-
ence of a party's non-economic (social, moral, legal, etc.) policies and, more
gcncrally, the (proposed) party platform upon the loyalty of each voter and
one would expect such influence to depend on individual tastes. Voter i votes
for the party which gives him (her) the highest utility, that is, voter i elects
party s only if the self-interest postulate
U~(t) ) U k(t), for all k~ s (15)
is satisfied. An implicit assumption underlying (14)-( I S) is that voters hold po-
litical parties, at least partially, responsible for economic (mis-)management.
Suppose that the bias for the opposition over the ruling party, say b(t) -
b2(t) - bt(t), is distributed across voters according to the probability density
function f(b(t)). !t then follows that the proportion of votes going to the ruling
party at time t, say v(t), is given by
v(t) - prob (b(t) C wt(t) - w2(t)) - F(w(t)) (ló)
where F(.) is the cumulative density function of the bias terms at time t and
w(t) - wt(t) - w2(t) denotes the differential in economic performance be-
tween government and opposition. Since this paper is mainly concerned with
the analysis of one election period and the opposition's performance index,
wz(t), is determined by economic factors which occurred during previous elec-
tion periods, one can set w2(t) - 0 without loss of generality. It remains to
explain the economic performance of the incumbent political party, wt(t) -
w(t)
Suppose this performance is determined by a weighted combination of all
present and past successes and failures, say ( W(t - j), j? 0[, and assume [hat
the weights diminish as one goes back into time. For example, choose the ex-
ponential form with scaling factor c(t) - P I [1 - exp(- pt)] then
w(t) - c(t) ~r exp[- p(t - k)]V(k)dk, p? 0, 0 s t s T (17)
0
where p is the rate of decay of voters' memories and T is the length of the elec-
tion period. The parameter p is like a backward (rather than a forward) dis-
count rate and in this sense resembles Pigou's 'defective telescopic faculty'
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(cf. Nordhaus, 1975). Observe that any economic events previous to the cur-
rent election period are ignored. ~-his assumption is not too serious, sincc the
analysis in the following sections is primarily concerned with v(T) - F(w(T))
and ( V(k), k c 0[ would receive very little weight anyway. A much more in~-
portant assumption is that w(t) is not affected by ( V(k), k~ t ~, so that (ration-
al) expectations of future events by voters are rulcd out. This assumption of
myopic voting is crucial to the analysis of Sections 4-6 and 8.
The measure of current success, V, is assumed to depend on rcal personal
disposable income, say Y-(1 - r)Q (ignoring interest receipts from the
government), the unemployment rate, u, the inflation rate, p, and the Icvel of
public spending, G, that is
V- V(Y, u, p, G), Vt ? 0, VZ 5 0, V3 5 0, Vy ? 0 (I8)
One interpretation of the different arguments in W(-) is that they retlect the
interests of different (pressure) groups in society (cf. van der Ploeg, 1984). For
example, Y, u, p and G might reflect the interests of respectively wage and
profit earners, unemployed, persons dependent on savings and state workers,
including the part of the population dependent on the state.3 An alternative
interpretation is that there are no interest groups, but that each individual
values economic performance in an identical manner and is interested in Y, u,
pandG.
Upon substitution of (17) and (18) into (16), one finally obtains an expres-
sion for the propor[ion of votes going to the ruling party, that is
t
v(t) - F[c(t) ~ exp(- p(t - k))V(Y(k), u(k), p(k), G(k))dk]. (19)
0
Empirical support for the inclusion of Y, u, p and G in V(.) may be found in
Goodhart and Bhansali (1970), Kramer (1971), Frey and Schncider (1978), Pis-
sarides (1980), Hibbs (1982) and Borooah and van der Ploeg (1982a) and
(1982b).
The next sections consider the influence of the proportion of votes cast in
favour of the ruling party on economic policy. This influence derives from the
observation that governments depend on survival and thereforc re-election, en-
sured when v(T) 1'~:, must be an important objective of economic policy.
The re-election objective may be frustrated due to the behaviour of the state
bureaucracy, which is interested in its own size (cf. managerial theories of the
firm [Koutsoyannis, 1971 ]) and does not depend on voters for its survival, and
the monctary authoritics.
4. Government versus the bureaucracy, monelary aulhorities :rnd the clectorrte
The behaviour of the three public authorities may be explaincd as follows. Tfic
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.tate bureaucracy simply maximizes its own size, proxied by G, subject to the
constraint imposed by the incumbent political party (5), given the level of eco-
nomic activity and the tax structure, r. The monetary authorities follow a pas-
sive monctary rulc of thc fonn (7) (cf. Friedman, 1961). The government, that
is, the incumbent political party, manipulates the rate of taxation to secure re-
clection. It can do this by choosing r to maximize the proportion of votes cast
at the next election, v(T), subject to the constraints of the economy (1)-(13).
One might argue that maximization of v(T) is not realistic, since v(T) ?'~z
would be sufficient to secure re-election. Here maximization of v(T) is consid-
cred anyway, because the ruling party may attempt to flatter itself (or the indi-
vidual politicians) by bcing as popular, or having as many seats in Parliament,
as possible, or alternatively may attempt to safeguard itself against any unde-
sirable unccrtain events (see note 9). The postulated behaviour for the three
public institutions corresponds to a Stackelberg (1952) hierarchical game with
the government as leader and the state bureaucracy, the monetary authorities
and the voters as followers.
For the purposes of this paper, the general problem of the optimal political
business cycle may therefore be reduced to
~T
Max exP(Pt)V((1 - r)Q'(G, r, L, P`), ~I Q- Q'(G, r, L, P`)l,
0
r P'(G, r, 1-, P`, ~), GJdt (20)
subject to the Nash-Cournot reaction funetion for the state bureaucracy
G-(~ f r)Q`(G, r, 1-, P`). (21)
the rule for the growth in the real supply of money, L- M ~ P, adopted by the
monetary authorities
L- L[m - P'(G, r, L. P`, ~)1,
and the adaptive expectations hypothesis
p` - Fz4[P'(G, r, L, p`, 0) - P`[
(22)
(23)
where m is exogeneous and the issuing of new bonds, B~r, follows from the
governmcnt budget constraint (4). Upon substitution of (21) into (20), (22)
and (23), one obtains the problcm
T





L- L[m - p..(T, 1-, p`, 0)1
and
p` - ~~[P"(T, L, P`, ~) - P`I
where
v~ - [Vi(~ - I~L~~LZ) - (VZ - V3~i)~(1 -C~) f V4Qo.-~1Q Q~a ,
vZ -[vi(1 - T) -(vZ - v3~~)~ t v4(~ t T))U~~LZ)Q'~,
V3 - VZL3 f V~I42.
V4 - V3~3I(1 - r) C B,
p~~ - ~t~(1 - Ci)Q Q~o ~ B.
pZ' - ~~)`(Ii~L2)Q~o ~ B.
pj' - L3pZ~ t ~2 ~ 0,
p4~ - ~3 ~ (1 - r) ~ 0,
and the multiplier under the policy rule (21) is given by
Q'~ - (1 - (1 - r)C~ f (I~Lt~L2) - ~ - r]-t ~ Q~ ~ 0.
(25)
(26)
The multiplier Q'~ is larger than the conventional multiplier (3), since as out-
put is stimulated, for example, due to a higher level of the real stock of money
or the expected rate of inflation, the state bureaucracy is allowed to expand
more and this causes output to increase even further. The consequences of
such a stimulus are an increase in disposable income and public spending and
a reduction in unemployment. Each of these increase electoral popularity,
although the resulting higher level of inflation might off-set the increase in
popularity. Hence, the signs of VZ and V; are undetermined. The effect of a
marginal increase in the tax rate is to allow a bigger state bureaucracy, wliich
stimulates output and employment, despite the depressing effects of a liigher
tax rate (cf. the Balanced Budget Theorem and (6)), and increases inflation.
Uisposable income is unaffected in the simple case of the Balanced Budget
Theorem (~ - 0, I i Li ~ LZ - 0). However, when the depressionary effects of
crowding out dominate the expansionary effects of allowing a big statc
bureaucracy (wlien 1~ L~ I LZ 1~), a higher tax rate decreases disposable in-
come. The lower Icvel of unemployment and higher level of public spending
raise electoral popularity, although the higher rate of inflation and possibly
[he lower level of disposable income tend to decrease electoral popularity.
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Ficnce the sign of V~ is undetermined, although it is more likely to be negative
than tlie signs of VZ and V3. Finally, a maintained change in the expected
clirect tax rate causes a transitory increase in the inflation rate and therefore
a transitory rcduction in popularity.
Thc gcncral problcm (24)-(2G) is discusscd in Scction 6. Beforc this is donc,
a spccial casc is discussed. This case assurnes that the elcctorate docs not care
about inflation (V~ - 0) and that the monctary authorities pursue a policy of
maintaining a constant stork of real money (m - p). The problem thcn reduces
to a static allocation problem between competing pressure groups and is dis-
cusscd in Section 5.
5. Reconciliation of compeling interests in the economy
Political economics seeks to explain the behaviour of governments. The the-
ory of economic policy focuses attention on the objective of stabilization and
views the government as a benevolent dictator implementing economic policy
in an attempt to reduce unemployment and inflation, ensure a satisfactory lev-
el of foreign reserves and increase economic growth. Most of the theory de-
veloped for this purpose has a normative character, since it is concerned with
how a government ought to behave in order to achieve the objectives of eco-
nomic policy. Sucli theory ignores the fact that a government has objectives of
its own, manifested in its ideology and its attempts to secure re-election, which
may well differ from the stabilization objective. Positive theories of how a
government ac~ually behaves are needed.
This paper assumes that the government represents the interes[s of various
pressure groups in society and formulates economic policy accordingly. The in-
terests of the private sector workers, public sector workers, unemployed and
capitalists may be captured by the vote function (24). This is not entirely satis-
factory, since some pressure groups may be more apathetic and others more
successful in having their interests represented by government. In such a case
the vote function (24) should be re-interpreted as an interest function, which
captures the interests of the various pressure groups as much as possible.
As long as the electorate remembers something of the past performance of
the government (p is finite), the government finds it optimal to choose econom-
ic policy to maximize the current measure of success (18) at each point of time.
The government then chooses r such that Vi - 0. When the unemployed
component of the electorate is only interested in disposable income (VZ - 0),
thc government equalizes the marginal rate of substitution between disposable
income and state spending (MRS -- V4~Vt) with the multiplier for dispos-
able income with respect to state spending (-(ItLtIL2 -~)Q~'). ln other
words, thc iso-popularity contour should be tangent to the economic model
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S~a~e spendinp. G
Figure 2. Political trade-off between the private and public sector
(see Figure 2). The optimal allocation between the private and public sector
only exists when crowding out of private investment is sufficiently large, or
when the permitted budget ratio is not too high, since then disposable income
and state spending are inversely related. Allowing for the interests of the un-
employed ( VZ ) 0) is equivalent to reducing the magnitude of the marginal
rate of substitution, hence the government increases state spending (at the ex-
pense of disposable income) in order to represent the interests of the uncm-
ployed.
Typically, a political-economic reaction function relating state spending to
output results. For example, when V- yt log Y t ti4 log G, the optimal level
ofstatespendingequalsG - gQ - ~ry4(1 t(-)~(yt(ItLtILZ-t)Q~) t y4~Q,
where the ratio of state spending to output depends on the relative magnitudes
of the `power' parameters, yt and ry4, the size of the multiplier and the per-
mitted deficit ratio, ,v. This policy is very different from the Keynesian
counter-cyclical type of stabilization policy, since g 1 0 rather than g c 0 holds.
The above approach is related to the interest function approach to political
economics (van Winden, 1982 and 1983), although there are two important dif-
ferences. Firstly, the interest function approach disaggregates the economy
more fully than Section 2 in order to distinguish between disposable income
and (un)employment of each of the four interest groups and also distinguishes
vote (or interest) functions for each pressure group. Although such a disaggre-
gation is clearly desirable in view of the distributional consequences of eco-
nomic policy, there are tremendous data problems and the analysis of disag-
gregated political-economic models is much more complicated. Secondly, tfie
interest function approach ( van Winden, 1982) takes a more naive view of tlte
government. More specifically, it assumes that the government is ignorant of
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the Keynesian multiplier, is only concerned with the constraint on the state
bureaucracy ( 5) and therefore in formulating economic policy takes private
sector and employment as given. For the example discussed above, such a
stratcgy would Iead to the rule gN - GIQ -(y4(t f~)~(tit f yd)) C g.
Thc naive strategy Icads to a lower ratio of state spending to output, since it
ignores the employment-generating effects of public expenditures. It is a mat-
ter for empirical investigation to decide on lhe most appropriate hypothesis.
6. Variations of the oplimal political business cycle
This section highlights the features of the political business cycle. For the
general problem it is difficult to obtain analytical results, hence a few special
cases will be discussed.
6.1 No monetary jeedbacks and no tax-indezation
The first case will be where the unions do not attempt to shift the burden of
direct taxes to firms ( ~3 - 0) and the money market does not feed back into
the goods market (ItLt ILZ - 0). The latter assumption is justified when there
is either exogeneous investment or a horizontal LM-curve ( in other words the
economy is at the lower end of the LM-curve, where money and bonds are per-
fect substitutes). Under these assumptions the general problem simplifies to
T
Max ~ exp(pt)V'(r, . , p`, .)dt (24')
r ~
subject to
p` - t~4~P"(r, . , P`, -) - P`) (26')
The solution fol(ows from the stationarity condition H, - 0 and the adjoint
equation X - -HPe, where
H g exp(Pt)V'(r, - . P`. .) f Xt~d~P"(r. .. P`, .) - P`1
defines the Hamiltonian and X is the adjoint variable corresponding to equa-
tion (26' )(see Bryson and Ho, 1969 for an exposition of optimal control tech-
niques). Upon solving for X from HT - 0, differentiating X, substituting X
and X into X-- HPe and rearranging, one obtains the differential equation
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~X - (IA~(t - l~~) - P]h f {4a142V7 (~ )
in tcnns of thc variablc X- V~Ipi'.
To obtain an explicit solution onc nccds to makc furthcr assumptions about
thc popularity function (18). Choosing Vi - vi, VZ -- v2u, V3 -- v; and
V4 - v4 and lincarizing the consumption function, onc can rcwritc cquation
(27) as
b-(pa(1 - pZ) - pl(u f A) t E3 (27' )
whcre A-(v~~ t v4Q~'-~)I [v2~(1 - Ci)] and B-- pi(u4 - p)v~~v,. Solv-
ing (27' ) givcs the optimal unemployment trajcctory
u(t) - uu - (uo - u)cxpl [p4(1 - p2) - pl(t - T)[ (28)
whcre the unemploymcnt rate attained on election eve follows from Lim x(t)
rtT
- 0 and is given by
u- Lim u(t) - v3p.i~vz - A
tIT
and thc uncmployment rate attained immcdiately aftcr the election is givcn by
u(~) - uo - v3pi(p4 - p)~ (vz[u4(t - p2) - p11 - A~ u.
Sincc dG -- duI(~Qi') and dr --[~(I - Ct)QQ'~ ]-~ du hold, both G
and r are inverscly related to u. Representative simulations based on (28) are
presented in Figure 3.
Unemployment (state spending) decreases (increases) gradually over each
election period and is raised (reduced) instantaneously after each electíon, since
uo z u. A low valuc of (p4(1 - pZ) - p] implies that thc govcrnmcnt implc-
ments most of the popular policies near election eve, because an elcctoratc
with a high rate of mcmory loss does not remember much of the earlicr policies
anyway and an economy with little compensation for increases in the costs of
living and slow formation of expectations docs not care too much about the
post-election inflationary consequcnces. The inflation rate rises over the clcc-
tion period and follows a much smoothcr path due to the gradual adaptation
to changes in the costs of living. As election eve approaches the government
is prepared to finance an expansion of the state burcaucracy, by raising direct
taxcs, to stimulate unemployment, whilst deceiving the elcctorate by ignoring
the inflationary consequences for the period following the election, in order to
gain popularity and increase the chances of re-election. Immcdiatcly aftcr
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F~igurr 3. Public spending, unemployment and in(lation in the optimal political business cycle
without monetary feedbacks
each election the new government raises unemployment, by cutting the expen-
ditures of the bureaucracy, to a high level in order to combat inflation. This
recurring political decision making causes the political business cycle.
The extent to which a government is prepared to force down unemployment
increases as the importance of intlation to the electorate diminishes and the im-
portance of disposable income (assuming ~~ 0), unemployrnent and public
spending to the elcctorate increases. A'Keynesian' government, defined as
allowing a rather large state bureaucracy (high ~), is more likely to stimulate
the economy in order to win the votes of persons interested in disposable in-
come. A Conservative administration is more likely to attract middle-class
voters (I3orooah and van Qer Ploeg, 1982c) and to serve them (cf. the `clientele
hypothesis' (Tufte, 1978; Hibbs, 1977]). Since middle-class voters are more
concerned with inflation (Hibbs, 1982), a Conservative government is Iess like-
ly to force down unemployment for political reasons. Finally, observe that in
taking account of disposable income and public spending tlie government
forces unemployment during the election cycle bclow what it would be in the
Nordhaus (1975) model.
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The assumptions of the Nordhaus (1975) case (Vt- V4 - 0) of this version
of the political busincss cycle have been strongly criticised by Chrystal and nlt
(1979) for two reasons. The first reason is that inflation enters lincarly whcrcas
uncmploymcnt cntcrs quadratically into the popularity function (18). This iti
not a scrious critiyue, sinre MacRae (1977) has shown how to allow for a fully
quadratic popularity function. The second reason is that `while actors form in-
flation expectations for their wage bargain, they do not Iet these expectations
influencc thcir voting bchaviour' and that this `inconsistcncy' wouW climinatc
the cycle. Replacing (18) by the function V(Y, u, pe, G) and repeating the
analysis, one obtains (for thc case V~ - V4 - 0) the following uncmployment
trajcctory
u(t) - ~3~~~, ~ I ~Z(~,( t-~Z) - n] I I 1- expl (~,(1 -~Z) - n](t - T) I I(28' )
From (28' ) it follows that the unemployment rate immediately after an elcc-
tion is higher than in the Nordhaus (1975) case and that the unemploymcnt
rate at election eve is forced down to zero and is therefore lower than in the
Nordhaus (1975) case. Removing the criticised inconsistency in the popularity
function actually gives the government a better chance to deceive the public
and therefore accentuates rather than eliminates the political business cycle.
This argument invalidates the second critique of Chrystal and Alt (1979b). This
paper sticks to equation (18), because it assumes that the electorate knows the
outcome of the historicaJ inflation rates at election eve.
The electoral cycle described in this section depends crucially on myopic
voting and adaptive expectations of the inflation rate. For example, when ex-
pectations are perfect (~a -~, p~ - p) the government does not vary unem-
ployment over the election period, but sets it to a constant rate, u- v3~at ~(v2
(1 -~2)] - A, equal to the one which would prevail immediately after election
eve. The electoral cycle also disappears under strategic voting (see Section 7).
6.2 Crowding ou1 and disposable income
The tax rate in the version of the electoral cycle discussed in Section 6.1 in-
creases over the election period in order to allow an expansion of public de-
mand and to stimulate the economy. This was possible, because raising taxes
(combined with raising state spending) actually increased disposable income.
W hen monetary feedbacks are considered, such an expansion may cause crowd-
ing out and depress disposable income. The consequences of such monetary
effects for the development of the optimal tax rate are discussed in this sub-
section.
Consider first the case where the monetary authorities adjust the growth in
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the nominal supply of money to equal thc rate of price inflation. This is a poli-
cy of maintaining a constant stock of real moncy, L, or bond-financc and
thereforc the solution procedure of Sectiun 6.1 may be used. The optimal un-
employment trajectory is still given by equation (28), except that the
paramctcr A is rcplaccd by
Á-[vt(~ - I~Li~L2) f vaQ~r'-t~~[vZ~(I - Ci)1 c A
It is clear thut there is still an electoral cycle of the type presented in Figure 3,
although the unemployment rate at each point of the election period is higher
and the tax rate is lower than without crowding out.
Raising taxes and state spcnding stimulates output and employment, raises
the demand for money for transactional purposes and therefore leaves less
funds for speculation. This bids up the real rate of interest, depresses private
investment and reduces output to below what it would be without crowding
out of private investment. When ItLt~LZ ~~, the process of crowdíng out
decreases disposable income and this explains why the government finds it op-
timal to implement a weaker package of demand management than before.
An altcrnative rule to adopt for the monetary authorities is a constant (growth
in the) nominal supply of money (cf. Friedman, 1961). In addition to the static
implications for taxation policy, observed for the rule of maintaining a con-
stant real stock of money, there will be dynamic effects due to the gradually
increasing inllation rate over the election period. Such an increase in inflation
would cause a gradual decline in the real stock of money, so that crowding out
of private investment would become stronger over the election period. This
process is just the consequence of inereasing prices combined with a down-
ward-sloping aggregate demand curve. The implication of the above argument
is that it may be no longer possible for a government to stimulate the economy
(at the expense of a moderate increase in inflation) towards election eve.
Thcre is another reason why maintaining a constant nominal, rather than
real, supply of money is less likely to lead to electoral cycles. In the case of
maintaining a constant real stock of money, an increase in inflation serves as
an increase in a`sclective excise tax' on holdings of real balances of money and
therefore reduces the real value of the public debt, even if the governrnent
budget is balanced (Bailey, 1956). Rewriting equation ( 4) in real terms
L f b~r -(G - rQ) t(I - r)b -(L t bIr)p, b- B~P (4')
illustrates the point. It gives a public revenue motive for inflationary finance
(cf. Brittan, 1978; Burton et al., 19R1), which is not an option under maintain-
ing a constant nominal supply of money. It is clear that there may well be con-
flict between the political motives underlying government policy and the poli-
cy adopted by thc monetary authorities.
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So far this section assumed that the expected intlation rate only affects the
wagc-price adjustment. However, it also represents minus the expcctcd return
on money, so that an increase in the expected inflation rate diminishes the de-
mand for money, forces down the rcal rate of intcrest and stimulates privatc
sector investment. }-Ienec, a policy of depressing expectations of the inflation
ratc in the early part of the election dcpresscs the inflation rate in Ihc lattcr
part, but also depresses output and employmcnt in the lattcr part. This effcc-
tivcly mcans that thcrc is Icss scopc for raising clcctoral popularity by dcmand
managcmcnt.
6.3 Aulonomous bc~lraviour oj the state bureaucracy
The previous sections argued that a government may find it optimal to stimu-
late state spending by raising taxes in order to gain political popularity. Some
might argue that a government may also find it optimal to reduce taxes over
the election period, since this would ceteris paribus stimulate output and em-
ployment and increase disposable income. Such arguments, however, require
a different explanation of the behaviour of the state burcaucracy.
Adopting the view that the implementation of planned state expenditures is
often pre-determined and takes some time while it is difficult to scrap state
projects once the decision to build has been made, one can no longer adhere
to hypothesis (5). A permanent income model, previously used in studies of
the consumption function (Friedman, 1956), of state expenditures is, in such
a case, perhaps more realistic (cf. Chrystal and Alt, 1979a, 1981b). Assume,
therefore, that state spending is a certain fraction of permanent income to the
state, say QP,
G- aQP, 0 ~ cx 5 1 (29)
and that permanent income of the state is a weighted average of all previous
incomes to the state, proxied by output of the economy, say
QP -~~ T(k)Q(t - k)dk, T(k( a 0, ~~ T(k) - 1 (30)
0 0
Choosing exponential weighting, say T(k) - Qexp(- (3k), one obtains the fol-
lowing model for state expenditures
V` - Q(aQ - G)s R? 0 (21 ~)
where the coefficients a and Q-t may be interpreted as the long-run value of
(~ f r) and the average implementation lag of state expenditures, respectively.
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State spending, as explained by equation (21 '), is no longcr dcpendent on
short-run changes in the rate of taxation or output, but instead depends simply
on the trend value of output. Empirical evidence for such a hypothesis may be
found in Chrystal and Alt (1981a, 1981b). Two implications of (21') are that
a government finds it more difficult to use state spending as a political instru-
ment, since state spending very much follows its own course (independent of
taxation policy), and that the bureaucrats prevent the use of state spending as
a counter-cyclical policy instrument. ln other words, most of government ac-
tion must come from the revenue rather than the expenditure side of the public
sector.
The problem of the optímal political business cycle under the alternative be-
haviour of the state is now described by equations (20), (21'), (22) and (23).
Let the monetary authorities adopt a passive monetary policy (m - p) and let
the government rely on bond-finance, so that the real stock of money, L, is
constant. Assuming there is no tax-indexation (~3 - 0) and re-working the
procedure underlying equations (24)-(28), one easily obtains the solutions for
the two special cases (3 - 0 and Q- oo. The optimal unemployment trajectory
is still given by equation (28), although the term A is replaced by
r~ -[v~(1 t IiL~ILZ - ix) f v4aC~]~(~~)`Ct)
where à- 0 if f3 - 0 and á- a if Q- oo. The optimal tax trajectory then
follows immcdiatcly using the relationship
dr - )`C~QduI[1 - (1 - r)C~ t IiL~ILZ - ~].
The optimal unemployment trajectory has the same shape as in Figure 3, al-
though the optimal tax rate now decreases over the election period and is raised
to a high value immediately after the election. With (21) cuts in the rate of taxa-
tion rcduce state spending, output and, if crowding out is not too strong, dis-
posable income. Dut with ( 21 ') the consequences are an inerease in state spend-
ing, output and disposable income, because the bureaucrats will no longer
allow the ratio of state spending to output to be decreased. Tax cuts now have
beneficial impacts on output, employment and disposable income, hence the
government finds it worthwhile to decrease the tax rate towards election eve.
A sluggish bureaucracy ( Q - 0) gives rise to smaller multipliers and therefore
requires larger tax cuts than a bureaucracy with no implementation lags (p -
~). Also a sluggish bureaucracy gives rise to a lower unemployment trajectory,
because a cut in the tax rate increases disposable income by a greater amount
and thus improves the trade-off between unemployment and disposable in-
come.
In the general case (0 G(3 e oo) the tax rate probably still decreases over the
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election period and is raised immediately after each election, but state spend-
ing follows a much rnore smoothed, that is, Icss political, path than the path
prescntcd in Figurc 3.
Ttie truth presumably lies somcwlicre inbctween equations (21) and (21 '),
that is, in practice there are implementation lags in state projects and shorl-n~n
effects of the rate of taxation on the ratio of public spending to permanent in-
comc (cf. Scction 9.2). Such a hypothcsis might explain that Chrystal and nlt
(1982b) find in thcir cmpirical study a version of (21') augmcnted with two
terms in p and u, both with a positive coefficient, since an incrcase in the tax
ratc incrcases both p and u.
The above discussed reasons, related to the behaviour of thc state, why a
government might find it optimal to gradually reduce the tax rate over the elec-
tion period. However, a government may also cut taxes towards clection eve
in order to secure a transient reduction in inflation and thereby increase
popularity. These matters are discussed in the next sub-section.
6.4 Tax-indexalion
In this section the potential for political exploitation of tax-indexation is brief-
ly discussed. For simplicity assume that m - p- pe and L3 - 0. The
government then chooses r to maximise
~T
exp(Pt)Vt(r, ., ., 0), V~ - V~ ~(I - u2), i- 1,4 (24")
0
subject to the adaptive expectations hypothesis for the expectcd change in the
rate of taxation (cf. (13))
0- n(i - ~)~ n? 0 (31)
The optimal tax rate satisfies the differential equation
Vj f OVq - ~IVI
where the initial tax rate satisfies V ~- 0 and the final tax rate satisfies V i f
rtV4 - 0. Choosing the same functional form for the popularity function as
in Section 6. l, it follows that the unemployment rate immediately after an elec-
tion is as before (with ~a - o0 of course) and the unemployment rate on elec-
tion eve is givcn by
ti - ut, f nr-3Ftj~(~Z(I -~Z)~(I - Ci)QQ~o 1 ~ ut,.
231
Since the final unemployment rate exceeds the initial rate, there is a political
business cycle. The government gradually reduces the tax rate over the election
period, since this reduces inflation and, if crowding out is not too strong, in-
creases disposable income at the expense of a moderate decrease in output and
cmployment. Immediately after the election taxes and therefore output and
eniployment are raised, so that the election cycle can commence again.
7. Rational volers and social optimal policies
The type of political decision making discussed in the previous section deceives
thc votcrs and therefore relies on a naive evaluation of the incumbent political
party. In other words, the electorate is presumed to know what it likes, but
fails to understand (and take account of) the interactions between politics and
the economy. A more rational electorate does not only care about the track
record of the various political parties, but would also penalise any undesirable
actions occurring after the election. When a government takes account of a ra-
tional electorate, it might simply implement the social optimal policies. The
purpose of this section is to contrast the policies adopted in the political bus-
iness cycle with the policies adopted at the social welfare optimum and to ex-
amine the actions the electorate can undertake in order to eliminate the elec-
tion cycle.
The social welfare optimum is obtained by choosing r to maximize social
welfare ( instead of (24))
~~ exp[ p(t - T)]V'(T, L, p~, 0)dt, O C p(C p) (33)
T
where p denotes the forward-looking social rate of discount, subject to equa-
tions (25) and (26). Typically the social rate of discount is smaller than the rate
of inemory loss, p, used in the vote function.
The equilibrium strategy of the social welfare optimum3 under the mone-
tary policy m- p(and the case L3 - p3 - 0) satisfies the relationship
t`'}p tat - MRS -(VZ -[Vi(~ - IiLiIL2) f V4Q~'-t]~
p~(1-pz) f p [~(1 - Ci)1 J ~V3- (34)
The term in curly brackets equals the reduced gradient of the current measure
of success, W, with respect to the unemployment rate. This term reflects a
direct effect and two indirect effects, since in the reduced form (of this special
case) both disposable income and state spending can be explained in terms of
the unemployment rate only. Plotting the iso-success contours and the wage
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equation in Figure 4 yields valuable information about the social optimal poli-
cies. Indifference between the welfare of current and future generations, or no
discounting (p - 0), leads to the `golden-rule', that is the iso-success contour
must be tangent to the long-run wage equation (MRS -~l ~(I -~2)). Con-
cern with only the present generation, or infinite discounting (p -~), leads
to the purely myopic social welfare optimum, that is where the iso-success con-
tour is tangent to the short-run wage equation ( MRS -~l). The general wel-
fare optimum (0 G p c or,) requires that the marginal rate of substitution
between the rate of inflation and the unemployment rate equals a constant
somewhere in betwcen the slope of the short-run and long-run wage equation
(~t c MRS c~l ~(1 - taZ)).
It is interesting to examine the welfare properties of the path attained in the
political business cycle. It is easily seen that the outcome on election eve cor-
responds to the purely myopic welfare optimum, since at that point the politi-
cians ignore future generations completely. The outcome immediately after
the election corresponds to the social welfare optimum with a negative rate of
discount (p -- p c 0).6 In the extreme case where voters do not reward past
performance at all, or complete memory loss (p -- oo), the political business
cycle disappears and the government simply puts the economy at the purely
myopic social welfare optimum on e(ection eve and is free to do what it wants
at other times. In the unlikely case that the electorate remembers all past po-
litical successes and failures equally well (P - 0), the outcome after the elec-
tion corresponds to the `golden-rule' strategy. ln the general case the optimal
unemployment rate immediately after the election is never abovc what it is on
Iso-success ~
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election eve (cf. Sections 6.1 and 6.2). The unemployment rates in the political
business cycle may start off lower than in the `golden-rule' (see example in
Figure 4), but always end up at the purely myopic social welfare optimum. A
typical election cycle is also drawn in Figure 4.~ There is no clear evidence
that dernocratic systems with regular elections have a higher propensity to in-
tlate or operate at lower levels of unemploymen[ than the social optimum out-
comcs (0 ~ p c oo).
lt is interesting to examine whether thc elcctorate by changing thcir voting
pattern to a strategic tactic, that is taking account of the political actions of
the govcrnmcnt, can eliminate the political business cycle. One way of achiev-
ing such a strategic goal is for the electorate to change its preferences on elec-
tion eve ( cf. MacRae, 1977) and thus penalize econornic cycles caused by the
government. The required change in the pattern of voting could be induced by
tlie press, which has the advantage that the government would also be in-
formed and has an opportunity to modify its actions. The preferences may re-
main thc same at all points of time before the election, but on election eve the
electorate must increase the importance of inflation or reduce the importance
of unemployment ( in the measure of current success ( 18)) to persuade the gov-
ernment to undertake a deflation of demand in order to have the same outcome
on election eve as just after the election. Such a deflation would naturally
eliminate the political business cycle. For example, in the case of Section 6.1
and 6.2 the electorate simply raises the relative weight of inflation with respect
to unemploymcnt on election eve to
(~~~~z)I(Rq(I - l~z) - P)~(kq - P)~ ~ (~3~~2)
and thereby changes the boundary condition to ensure u- uo.
As far as the electorate is concerned, there is a trade-off between conven-
tional and strategic voting. The former causes economic instability, whereas
the latter puts the economy at the purely myopic social welfare optimum with
rclatively high inflation and low unemployment. It is not clear whether voters
prefer stability or short-sightedness.
The next section will show, however, that a government might avoid myopic
decision making when the objective of vote maximization at the forthcoming
clection is abandoned.
8. Slrategic behaviour of governments ~
It is not clcar whether it is advisable for a government to maximize votes at the
forthcoming election when it also aspires to win the election after a possible
second term in office. When the government has some political slack at the
next election, it may prefer not to create a pre-election boom in order to avoid
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the inflationary consequences during a possible second term in office and spoil
the chances for re-election. The same argument applies when the governmcnt
is confident of winning the first and second election, since then it will ncitlicr
create a pre-election boom for the first nor for the second election in order nut
to spoil the chances for the third election. The implicit strategy underlying thc
above reasoning may be formalized as follows. The governmcnt maximizcs
the number of uninterrupted terms in office, say K, so that the govcrnmcnt
chooses T and the largest K to satisfy the economic constraints (25)-(2f,) and
the re-election constraints
v(kT) ~ 0.5 f É(or "v(kT) É), k- 1, 2, ..., K- 1 (34)
where e and É are safety margins. This formulation ignores any utility derivcd
from returning to power after a period out of office. One way to find the max-
imum number of uninterrupted terms in office is to solve thc problem ( Max
r
v(KT) subject to (25)-(26) and (34)) sequentially for K- 1, 2, ... until an
infeasible problem is reached. The final K then gives the maximum number of
terms in office. The optimal trajectory for the policy instrument r then follows
from the first order conditions associated with lhe Lagrangian
K-I
L- v(KT) f E tykv(kT), ~k z 0 (3S)
k-1
subject to equations (25)-(26). Although the solution to this problem is com-
plicated,g a few general comments can be made.
The variable tyk is the shadow price of increasing the safety margin at the
k-th election, that is, the marginal decrease in votes at the election after the last
term in office due to a unit increase in e. This variable must, of course, be zero
when the government expects to enjoy political slack at the k-th election (v(kT)
~ 0.5 t e), otherwise the k-th election is crucial (biting) and ~k ~ 0. In the
case that there are no bottle-neck elections previous to the K-th election the
govcrnment simply maximizes v(KT) subject to equations (25)-(26). This has
the effect of lengthening the election period from T to KT periods, so that the
political business cycle is spread out over a longer period. This has the advan-
tage that there are less economic fluctuations caused by political actions and
less time is spent near the myopic outcome on election eve. It is, however, pos-
sible that a government has to undertake corrective actions to secure the win-
ning of a bottle-neck election. This implies increasing the weight exp(pt) in
(24) to
exp(pt)~ I f~k exp[(K - k)t] ) for t E (0, kT) (36)
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and leaving the wcight unaffected for t E(kT, KT), where k denotes the bottle-
neck election. The effect of increasing the weight on the current measure of
success before the biting election is that the government creates a sufficiently
large boom to secure the victory in the bottle-neck election, but uses any re-
maining degrees of freedom to secure the K-th election. The result is a short-
run political business cycle superimposed on a political cycle with a longer
pcriod.
Frey and Ramser (1976) use a similar objective of maximizing the expecta-
tion of the uninterrupted length in office, but interpret the share of votes cast
in favour of the government, v(t), as the probability of winning an election at
time t.9 Hence, the government maximizes the expected length in office
~ Zk, Z~ - v(T), ZK - v(KT)ZK-i (37)
k-1
where ZK denotes the probability of being K uninterrupted terms in office. As-
suming that elections are held continuously, Frey and Ramser (1976) approx-
imate (37) by
~~ Z(K)dK, Z(0) - v(0), ~ - (v(KT) - 1 jZ (37' )
0
Assuming that the electorate suffers from complete memory loss (p - oo)to
and maximizing (37' ) subject to equations (25)-(26), one obtains, for the case
m- p and L~ -~~ - 0, the steady-state solution (34) with the discount rate,
P, replaced by the probability of not being re-elected, 1- v(.). A government
facing defeat therefore discounts the future heavily. The resulting unemploy-
ment rate is less than the `golden-rule' and higher than the purely myopic wel-
fare optimum, hence tfie optimal unemployment rate is no longer purely myo-
pic in democratic systems as long as the government changes its objective from
maximizing the probability of winning the next election to maximizing the ex-
pected length in office.
The above assumed that the government does not value a return to office
after a period in opposition, although considerations of this type may alter the
bchaviour of an outgoing administration. For example, a government with the
prospect of losing the next election may prefer to lose dramatically in order to
Icave the incoming government worse off and thereby increase the chances of
winning the election after the next. Formal analysis of such behaviour involvcs
issucs of blame and will be left for future research.
9. Concluding remarks
An IS-LM model of the goods and money markets was extended with a sim-
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ple model of the state bureaucracy, Okun's law and a price- and tax-augmented
Phillips-curve to obtain an explanation of disposable income, unemployment,
inflation and state spending in terms of past and currcnt Icvcls of the ratc of
taxation. This was followcd by a qualitative choice theory of government
popularity, whereby the (intended) vote share was related to past and currcnt
Icvels of disposable income, unemployment, inflation and statc spcnding. To
obtain a closed political-economic model, lhe paper assumed that the govern-
ment employcd thc tax rate to manipulate votes and maximize thc probability
of re-election. This Ied to three approaches to the formulation of poli~ical tax
stratcgies.
The first approach sets the tax rate to reconcile the interests of competing
pressure groups and thus obtains a political trade-off betwcen thc private and
public sector. This approach concentrates on a static allocation between tlie
different interest groups. The second approach focuses on the dynamics of in-
(lation expectations and the resulting opportunities for political exploitation.
lt relies on a naive electorate and excludes strategic voting. It was shown to be
optimal for a government to reflate the economy, by raising taxes to finance
an expansion of employment-generating state projects, towards election eve in
order to gain votes and lumber the incoming administration with the inflation-
ary consequences. Tighter control of the state, crowding out of private invest-
ment, beneficial impacts of higher expected in(lation on real quantities, high
electoral value of inflation and low electoral values of disposable income, un-
employment and state spending attenuate the election cycle. A different hypo-
thesis for the state bureaucracy, which explains state spending by the trend
levcl of output and is independent of tax policy, leads to quite different re-
sults. Now the bureaucrats prevent the use of state spending as a political in-
strument and therefore the tax rate must be cul towards election eve in order
to gain votes. Tax-indexation can also be exploited, since the government can,
by cutting taxes and thereby reducing intlation, gain popularity towards elec-
tion eve, despite the cuts in state projects and higher levels of unemployment.
The third approach considers the objective of maximizing the expected unin-
terrupted length in offiee and results in a short-run political business cycle su-
perimposed on a longer cycle. For lhe special case of an electorate with no
memory, the election cycle disappears and the outcome corresponds to a non-
myopic political welfare optimum with the discount rate equal to the proba-
bility of not being re-elected.
There remain a number of avenues to be explored. More realistic economies
w~ith multiple sectors and international linkages may be considered. The many
economic lags, for example, occurring in the balance of payments adjustment,
may be politically exploited in the same manner as adaptive expectations of in-
flation and tax policy. Also the political aspects of the model require further
disaggregation. For example, the economy and the electorate may be explici~ly
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dividcd into a number of (mutually exclusive) pressure groups with different
interests and voting patterns (cf. van Winden, 1982, 1983). The emphasis on
conflict between a-political, that is, independent of (general) re-elec[ion, pub-
lic sector institutions, for example, the state bureaucracy, Central Bank, trade
unions, local authorities, etc., and the incumbent political party could be fur-
ther investigated, since the paper concentrated on the conflict between state
and government only. For example, Frey and Schneider (1981) have performed
a study of the conflict between the Bank and the government and G~rtner
(1981) investigated political reasons for the leaders of a centralized trade union
to recommend political wage rises. These studies are only a first step. The gov-
crnmcnt might maximize ideology subject to attaining sufficient votes to se-
cure re-election. This means pursuing a fairly ideological policy, specific to tlie
colour of the incumbent political party, at the start of the election period and
progressive adjustments to ensure re-election towards the end of the period.
Sotne argue that the political business cycle is incompatible with the rational
expectations hypothesis, since political exploitation of lags would be `seen
through' under rational expectations and therefore be impossible. The rela-
tionship betwecn these two lines of thought requires further attention. AI-
though a number of studies (e.g., McCallum, 1978; Minford and Peel, 1982)
argue tliat the political business cycle disappears, van der Ploeg (1987) shows,
within the context of a real-exchange-rate overshooting model of a small open
economy with rational expectations and sluggish labour markets, that the ide-
ology of the incumbent government is 'coloured' by the ideology of a prospec-
tive future government and that political uncertainty can lead to significant
jumps in the economy on the morning after the election.
Notes
I. A subscript i denutes a partial derivative with respect to the i-th argument.
2. The solid arrows denote effects occurring during the election period under consideration. The
broken arrows denote ef(ects occurring outside the election periud under consideration.
3. Of course, in practice it is difficult to assign each argumem in V(-) to one particular group in
society. Wage and profit earners might also be interested in the level of public spending and
state workers may also be inrerested in the unemployment rale. Van Winden (1982) develups
the related concept of an interest functiun, whereby thr interests of (our pressure groups,
capitalists, private seclur wurkrrs, public sector workers and dependents on the state, were dis-
tinguishcd. This implies that Y in V(-) shuuld be decomposed into disposable wage and profit
income, but Ihis was not Jone as this paper assumes a constant share of labour in value added
(ser (R)1.
4. The sprcial case of ihr rhosen popularity funetiun curresponding to V~ - V~ - o has been
used by Nurdhaus (1975) in his pioneering article and currespunds Io A- 0. Mure general
lunctional forms of (18) usually reyuire (?7) tu be solvrd in terms o( the policy variable, T,
rather than the unemployment rate, u.
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S. For thc classical exposition of this type of problem rcfer to Phclps (1967) and for details on
the transitional dynamics refer to Turnovsky (1981).
6. The use o( the term social welfare optímum in this case is somcwhat perverse, since thc
equilibrium is no longer stable.
7. The shape is very different from the cycle suggested in Figure 2 of Frcy (1978a).
8. In princíple one can find a solution lo the problem by dcfining the Hamiltwrian as bcfore (scc
Scction 6.1) but replacing exp(pt) by (36), cxpressing the optimal outcomcs in tcnns of thc
non-zero tGk, substituting these into thc active constraints of (34) and finally sohing for thc
non-zero ~t.
9. This reyuires an extension of the theory proposed in Section 3. Change (16) to v(t) - F(w(tp
f e(t), where e(t) denotes an error lerm lo allow for uncertain political evcnts of the momcnt
(e.g., World Cup, Falklands crisis, etc.). The probabilily of winning an eleclion equals
probw(t) ~ 0.5~ - I- F~j0.5 -F(w(t))~, where F~ is the cumulative density function of e,.
When cr is taken from a uniform distribution, this probability is linearly related to w(I).
Hence (17) may be used as [he maximand for lhe probability of winning the next electiorr.
10. Frey and Ramser (1976) make a somewhat peculiar assumption here, since when tlie voters
have no memory the political business cycle disappears.
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